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Abstract
Decades of cooperation between international antitrust authorities are now under
threat following two controversial rulings by the US courts of appeal in New York
and Washington D.C. William Kolasky examines the far-reaching implications of
the Empagran and Kruman cases
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The twenty years since theenactment of the Federal TradeAntitrust Improvements Act(the FTAIA) in 1982 have seensteady progress in the
cooperation of antitrust authorities
worldwide. Prior to the FTAIA’s passage,
the US’s extraterritorial application of its
antitrust laws created international
friction. Under the strictures of the
FTAIA, US courts’ authority to decide
cases involving foreign conduct is limited
to those in which there exists a direct and
substantial effect on US commerce, and
that effect gives rise to a claim under US
antitrust laws. Since the FTAIA was
enacted, numerous countries have enacted
effective antitrust laws and international
agreements to combat antitrust violations,
including between the US and Australia,
Brazil, Britain, Canada, the European
Union, and Germany, among others.
International cooperation has been
particularly strong in anti-cartel
enforcement. In 2003 the US, EU,
Canada, and Japan for the first time
jointly conducted searches and interviews
in a cartel investigation. Foreign
governments have also located nationals
indicted in US cases and obtained 
key evidence for US prosecutions of 
cartel cases. Under this umbrella of
international cooperation, US cartel
enforcement has reached an all-time high,
with fines totalling over $2 billion in the
last six years and jail sentences for
convicted individuals averaging more 
than 18 months.
One of the keys to this era of partnering
among nations has been the mutual
respect by jurisdictions of each other’s
right to protect their own commerce. As
US appellate judge and former Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Diane Wood
noted, “Enforcement… is best served
when each country watches out for
anticompetitive effects in its own market,
but each country is also prepared to
cooperate to the greatest extent legally
possible with fellow enforcers.”
Unfortunately, this atmosphere of
worldwide cooperation is now in jeopardy
as a result of two recent US appeal
decisions in Empagran v. Hoffman-LaRoche
and Kruman v. Christie’s International. 
In Empagran, the US court of appeals
for Washington D.C. held that American
courts had authority to hear antitrust
claims brought by foreign plaintiffs against
foreign defendants over foreign conduct.
The plaintiffs in Empagran are foreign
purchasers of selected vitamins, who
charged the mostly foreign sellers and
distributors of these vitamins with a global
price-fixing conspiracy. The court
concluded that, under the FTAIA, so long
as anticompetitive conduct had a ‘direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect’ on US commerce, foreign plaintiffs
could sue under US antitrust laws, even
where the foreign plaintiffs’ injuries
stemmed solely from the illegal conduct’s
effect on foreign commerce. Similarly, in
Kruman, the US court of appeals for New
York found that US courts had authority
under the FTAIA to award damages for
price-fixing in an action brought by
foreign buyers and sellers against two
auction houses, even where the plaintiffs’
injuries stemmed from purchases in
auctions outside the US
Empagran and Kruman created a deep
division within US appeals courts on the
issue of whether US courts have authority
to hear antitrust claims brought by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign defendants where
the plaintiff’s injury occurs in foreign,
rather than US, commerce. In Den Norske
Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof, another
US court of appeals sitting in Texas held
that US courts do not have authority
under the FTAIA to hear such claims. Den
Norske involved allegations of a price-
fixing, territorial division, and bid-rigging
conspiracy between foreign barge service
providers. The plaintiff, also a foreign
corporation, sued defendants in a US
court, arguing that the court could hear its
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claim pursuant to the FTAIA. The court
rejected the plaintiff’s claim, holding that
the suit was not related to US commerce,
as the plaintiff’s injury arose from the
conduct’s foreign effects. The US
government endorsed the court’s holding,
submitting an amicus brief in Den Norske
arguing against the extraterritorial
application of the FTAIA to foreign
plaintiffs suing foreign defendants over
antitrust injuries arising in foreign
commerce – a position the government
reiterated in an amicus brief filed in the
court of appeals in Empagran in support of
the defendants’ petition for rehearing.
The petition for rehearing was denied
by the court of appeals, but the Supreme
Court has now agreed to review the lower
court decision in Empagran, and will hear
arguments and issue a decision before the
end of its current term in June 2004. The
Republic of Germany and US Chamber of
Commerce each filed an amicus brief
asking the Supreme Court to review the
case, in which they joined the US
Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission in supporting the defendants’
argument that the lower court decision in
Empagran should be reversed.
There are two legal issues in the debate
over whether foreign plaintiffs may sue
under the FTAIA. First, do US courts have
jurisdiction to hear claims by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign defendants over
foreign antitrust injuries? Second, do
foreign plaintiffs have standing to bring
these suits in US courts? 
On jurisdiction, the split among the
lower courts revolves around the language
of Section 6(a) of the FTAIA, which
requires that, to be heard in the US, the
conduct causing a foreign antitrust injury
must have a ‘direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect’ on US
commerce, and the conduct’s effect must
‘give rise to a claim’ under US antitrust
laws. The debate centres on the meaning
of the word ‘a’ in the second requirement
– does the FTAIA mandate that the
conduct give rise to ‘a’ claim or to the
plaintiff’s claim? The D.C. and New York
courts take the former view; the Texas
court and US government take the latter
view. The D.C. court did not find plain
meaning within the statutory language, but
concluded that the language and legislative
history, taken together, supported
extending jurisdiction to a foreign
plaintiff’s claim of an antitrust injury in
foreign commerce, so long as the alleged
conduct also affected US commerce in that
it could give rise to someone’s claim under
US antitrust laws. 
On standing, Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-
O-Mat requires the plaintiff bringing an
antitrust claim in a US court to show that
his injury is ‘of the type the [US] antitrust
laws were intended to prevent.’ The D.C.
court found that plaintiffs had standing
under Brunswick because the foreign injury
in Empagran stemmed from conduct 
that harmed US commerce and thereby
violated the Sherman Act, even though 
the plaintiff’s injury did not stem from 
that harm. 
The US Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission filed a joint
amicus brief petitioning the court for an en
banc rehearing, arguing that the D.C. court
got it wrong on both the jurisdictional and
standing issues. The agencies argued that
‘the most natural reading’ of the FTAIA’s
language is that the effect on US
commerce must give rise to the plaintiff’s
claim, not just someone’s claim. The
agencies argued further that US law
cannot be applied extraterritorially
without a clear statement of intent to 
do so, which no one could argue the
FTAIA contains.
The implications of Empagran, if
affirmed by the Supreme Court, are
troublesome. First, the decision invites
global forum shopping. The Den Norske
court found that an expansive
interpretation (like the one adopted in
Empagran) would allow plaintiffs to ‘flock’
to US courts for redress, even where there
was no connection between the plaintiff’s
claim and US commerce. While nearly
100 foreign jurisdictions have antitrust
legislation prohibiting cartels, the US
alone allows plaintiffs to recover treble
damages. Moreover, only the US has a
well-established class action structure. By
allowing foreign plaintiffs to sue over
foreign conduct in US courts, the US
becomes a magnet for plaintiffs from all
over the world. US court dockets should
expect an influx of such global forum
shoppers and the class counsel that seek to
represent them. 
Second, the Empagran decision may
undermine cartel enforcement in the EU,
US, and other jurisdictions around the
world. The Empagran court bolstered its
decision with the rationale that, by
allowing foreign plaintiffs to sue foreign
defendants over foreign conduct,
defendants would be deterred from
engaging in global conspiracies because
they would fear the prohibitive costs of
treble damage suits from plaintiffs
worldwide. The US Justice Department
and Federal Trade Commission disagree;
they believe that foreign plaintiff suits
would weaken, not bolster, the deterrence
of global conspiracies because it would
reduce the incentive for potential
whistleblowers to come forward and seek
Since the Empagran decision, the Justice Department has sought to blunt its impact by
proposing to limit private damage recovery available from a leniency applicant to actual (rather
than treble) damages. Senators Mike DeWine (R-OH) and Herb Kohl (D-WI) introduced the
Antitrust Enforcement Enhancements and Cooperation Incentives Bill (S. 1797) to the Senate
Judiciary Committee on October 29, 2003, which proposes to limit the amount of damages
recoverable from a leniency applicant to the actual damages sustained by the claimant, thus
removing a private plaintiff’s right of action for treble damages. In introducing the Bill, Senator
DeWine noted that it would ‘remove a significant disincentive to those who would be likely to
seek criminal amnesty and should result in a substantial increase in the number of antitrust
conspiracies being detected.’
Unfortunately, the legislation, even if enacted, would be only a partial answer. The Bill’s private
damage limits will apply only to companies seeking leniency from the Justice Department, not
the EU. The European Commission’s leniency policy specifically states that its criminal immunity
cannot protect defendants from civil liability. Some nations have adopted blocking measures
against enforcement of private foreign judgments. In 1980 Britain enacted the United Kingdom
Protection of Trading Interests Act, under which the Secretary of State for Trade could prevent
enforcement of foreign judgments for multiple damages. Australia and Canada have similar
protections in place. However, without a blocking measure, leniency applicants in the EU and
elsewhere will assuredly face the threat of treble damages under US law.
DoJ reconsiders treble damages 
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amnesty under Justice Department and
European Commission leniency policies.
These leniency policies – which motivate
whistleblowers to step forward – are the
keys to the tremendous success of
international cartel enforcement. 
The Justice Department’s policy grants
amnesty to corporations who are the first
to report illegal activity, so long as they
curtail their participation in the illegal
activity upon notice, and fully and
honestly cooperate with the Justice
Department’s investigation. In return for
the applicant’s cooperation, the Justice
Department will reduce criminal penalties
substantially – in many cases, amnesty
applicants pay no fine at all. After a 2002
overhaul of its policy, the European
Commission’s leniency programme is very
similar to the Justice Department’s
programme. As a result of these
programmes, amnesty applications in the
US have soared to approximately three
per month in 2003, and many applicants
seek leniency simultaneously from both
European and US authorities. The
programmes are essential for uncovering
illegal cartel behaviour and prosecuting
violators worldwide. According to
Deborah Platt Majoras, the US principal
deputy assistant attorney general, the
Justice Department’s leniency programme
has been its “most active generator of
criminal investigations in recent years.”
But if US courts lend an ear to private
treble damage claims based on foreign
conduct, the potential exposure for
amnesty applicants to treble damage
liability could explode. While the Justice
Department and the EU can offer criminal
amnesty, neither can protect corporations
from private damage suits. In calculating
the costs of seeking leniency, foreign and
domestic corporations will have to factor
in potential treble damage suits from
worldwide claimants. This may provide a
powerful disincentive to blow the whistle
on illicit activities in the future.
Finally, Empagran ignores conscious
policy decisions that foreign governments
have made not to inflict treble damages on
corporate defendants or to allow private
citizens to act as government enforcers. In
their petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the Empagran defendants
argue that such an expansive reading of
US law will lead to ‘conflict and
resentment’ among the nations. The
Republic of Germany in an amicus brief
agrees and warns that European nations
could refuse to enforce foreign private
judgments against their nationals. There
have already been numerous efforts to
block the fast-expanding reach of US
antitrust laws, including a British statute
that allows the Secretary of State for Trade
to prohibit the enforcement of foreign
judgments for multiple damages. US
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Makan
Delrahim recently acknowledged that it
would be “self-centred and ultimately 
self-defeating” for the US to position itself
as the world’s antitrust ‘policeman.’ The
unintended result may be that, rather than
cooperate with the US in prosecuting
international cartels, foreign nations 
will work against the US to protect their
own sovereignty. 
Unless reversed, Empagran will have far-
reaching effects on antitrust enforcement.
The decision would turn US courts into
international tribunals for antitrust
enforcement, dispensing American-style
justice worldwide. This intrusion could
create international friction that could
undermine the progress made towards
cooperation in antitrust enforcement. 
It could also harm the leniency
programmes established by the European
Commission and the Justice Department
by creating disincentives for defendants to
come forward and expose cartel
behaviour.  ■
The author is a partner at Wilmer Cutler &
Pickering in Washington D.C. and is a former US
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for International
Antitrust Enforcement
The Empagran case will impact not just corporate decisions on whether to seek leniency, but
also decisions on how best to seek leniency and to avoid treble damages claims. Corporations
should be aware that written submissions made to foreign agencies for amnesty purposes may
be discoverable in private actions for damages in the US. In a recent private action for treble
damages arising from Empagran, a D.C. federal judge ordered the defendants to turn over
written submissions made to foreign agencies, including the European Commission, the
Canadian Department of Justice, and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
Many of these submissions were provided to the agencies as a condition of criminal amnesty
under their leniency programmes. However, the court found that the voluntary submission of
written statements waived any attorney-client privilege or work product protection that might
otherwise have applied.  
The Northern District of California took the opposite view in the In re Methionine antitrust
litigation, refusing plaintiffs’ discovery request for defendants’ written submissions to the
European Commission’s leniency programme. The court found that principles of comity
outweighed plaintiffs’ need for discovery under the circumstances.  
It is unclear which path US appellate courts will take on the issue. In light of this uncertainty,
companies should consider submitting oral, rather than written, statements on potentially illicit
activities. Many jurisdictions, including the US and the European Commission, allow paperless
submissions, in which corporations can apply for leniency orally rather than in writing. The
European Commission will accept oral leniency applications under its 2002 Leniency Notice,
and will treat these applications as official Commission documents. Taking advantage of the
paperless submission process, where available, will mean less potentially discoverable
information in private actions for damages.
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